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Abstract 
 
How should critical International Relations (IR) scholars approach the ‘impact 
agenda’? While most have been quite resistant to it, I argue in this essay that critical 
IR should instead embrace the challenge of impact – and that both IR as a field and 
the impact agenda more broadly would gain greatly from it doing so. I make this case 
through three steps. I show, firstly, that critical IR has till now been very much at the 
impact agenda’s margins, and that this situation contrasts strikingly with its well-
established importance within IR teaching and research. I argue, secondly, that critical 
IR scholars both could and should do more impact work – that the current political 
conjuncture demands it, that many of the standard objections to doing so are 
misplaced, and indeed that ‘critical’ modes of research are in some regards better 
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suited than ‘problem-solving’ ones to generating meaningful change – and offer a 
series of recommended principles for undertaking critically-oriented impact and 
engagement work. But I also argue, thirdly, that critical social science holds important 
lessons for the impact agenda, and that future impact assessments need to take these 
lessons on board – especially if critical IR scholarship is to embrace impact more 
fully. Critical IR, I submit, should embrace impact; but at the same time, research 
councils and assessments could do with modifying their approach to it, including by 
embracing a more critical and political understanding of what impact is and how it is 
achieved.  
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Introduction 
 
Impact and the research underpinning it are, to coin a phrase, ‘always for someone 
and for some purpose’ (Cox, 1981). They are always oriented to certain audiences or 
interlocutors (‘users’ and ‘beneficiaries’ in the contemporary jargon); they always 
serve or at least complement specific functions, interests and values; and they are also, 
it may be added, always situated – that is, practised by individuals and their 
collaborators in ways which are inevitably affected by social locations, statuses, 
networks and biases. Yet the social contexts of knowledge- and impact-making never 
fully determine what is produced. To the contrary, researchers – or at least those of us 
fortunate enough to be able to select and pursue our own lines of enquiry – possess 
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enormous licence to choose which audiences and interlocutors, and which functions, 
interests and values, we aspire to support and align our research with, and which not. 
As the sociologist Howard Becker put it five decades ago, ‘the question is not whether 
we should take sides, since inevitably we will, but rather whose side we are on’ 
(Becker, 1967: 239). 
 
This essay takes Becker’s words as a starting point for examining the contemporary 
UK ‘impact agenda’ and International Relations’ contribution and response to it. It 
asks his ‘whose side?’ question not only of the impact agenda itself (‘whose side is 
the impact agenda on?’), but also of IR as a field (‘whose side is IR on, judging by its 
record of non-academic impact?), and of critical IR specifically (‘whose side is 
critical IR on, judging by its record of non-academic impact?). It asks these questions 
both empirically, especially in relation to the UK’s 2014 Research Excellence 
Framework (REF), and normatively, by reflecting on whether and how IR, and critical 
IR in particular, should engage with the impact agenda. Overall it argues, contrary to 
the vast majority of critical social science-informed reflections on the subject, that 
critical IR scholars should embrace the impact agenda much more fully than they 
have done thus far; and that both IR as a field and the impact agenda more broadly 
would gain greatly from them doing so. 
 
We proceed through three steps. First, immediately below, I consider how 
International Relations in the UK, and especially its critical variants, have contributed 
to and engaged with the impact agenda since its introduction into the UK higher 
education landscape around 2010. This paves the way, secondly, for a set of 
reflections on how critical IR could and should approach impact, and on the central 
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principles as well as research and impact strategies through which it might do so. This 
then leads me, last, to argue that critical social science-informed insights hold 
important lessons for the impact agenda, and that future impact assessments need to 
take these lessons on board – especially if critical IR scholarship is to embrace impact 
more fully. These arguments are developed via an analysis of 43 REF 2014 impact 
case studies – all of the publicly-available IR-related case studies produced by the top 
fifteen impact-rated Politics and International Studies departments in the UK’s 2014 
national research assessment (Times Higher Education, 2014) – as well as reflections 
informed by my personal experiences of undertaking, and supporting colleagues in 
undertaking, non-academic engagement.  
 
It should be noted from the outset that by ‘critical IR’ I mean distinct two things, both 
of which follow from Horkheimer and especially Cox’s conceptualisations of ‘critical 
theory’ (Horkheimer 1972; Cox 1981), but are not limited or reducible to them. A 
first meaning is substantive: here critical research can be understood as work which is 
informed by the core methodological principles of historicism, holism and 
reflectivism (Jahn, 1998); and critical IR can in turn be understood as an umbrella 
term for those approaches which share these principles, especially work within the 
Marxist, post-structuralist, feminist and queer, and post-colonial traditions. That’s one 
meaning of ‘critical IR’ as used here. The second, by contrast, refers to ethos, 
positioning and audience, critical research in this sense being work which is, or at 
least thinks of itself as being, oppositional: as opposed to traditional conceptions of IR 
as a discipline, as critical of the dominant practices and structures of contemporary 
world politics, and as favouring instead various forms of radical or structural 
transformation. This does not mean, it should be stressed, that critical scholars all 
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agree on which structures or practices should be opposed, or indeed on how the world 
should be changed – far from it. Moreover, it should not be assumed that the two 
meanings above are coterminous: not all research within the above traditions is that 
politically radical, and not all positivist scholarship is as conservative as sometimes 
suggested. Hence my aim in considering the place of critical IR within the impact 
agenda is not to present a false unity, and still less to suggest that scholarship which 
declares itself ‘critical’ has a monopoly on insight or virtue, but rather to reflect on 
two overlapping but far from identical issues: the place of Marxist, post-structuralist, 
feminist and queer, and post-colonial traditions, and of opposition and of critique, 
within the impact agenda. It is also worth noting that, while my focus here is on 
critical scholarship within IR, many of the issues identified recur beyond this 
particular field, and relate to the problematic relationship between the critical social 
sciences and the impact agenda more broadly. To this extent, this essay is intended as 
a set of reflections on the critical social sciences – and definitely not as an argument 
about the singularity, let alone superiority, of IR. 
 
The state of play 
 
That critical social scientists, whether in IR or beyond, have for the most part been 
highly critical of the impact agenda is a point which does not need belabouring. In 
some cases the criticisms have been elements of broader critiques, whether of the 
worldwide transformation of higher education (Collini 2012) or of the UK’s research 
assessment system, as in Derek Sayer’s (2015) critique of the ‘rank hypocrisy’ and 
‘insult’ of the REF. And in other cases the criticisms have been directed specifically 
at the idea and assessment of impact (e.g. Watermeyer 2016). Within IR, debates have 
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generally pitched calls for IR as a field and IR theory in particular to become more 
‘policy relevant’ (e.g. Lepgold and Ninsic 2001), against counter-arguments, such as 
those from Johan Eriksson (2014) and Beate Jahn (2017), to the effect that theoretical 
work is politically relevant anyway. When critical IR has entered these debates in any 
explicit way, it has either been to support arguments for the value of theory (as in 
Jahn 2017) – with at least the sub-text that calls for greater ‘relevance’ and ‘impact’ 
overlook or undervalue the actual impact of IR theory – or to insist that critical IR 
illustrates IR’s relevance problem at its worst (Wallace 1996). Critical social science 
and critical IR specifically clearly have a troubled relationship with the impact agenda. 
 
In parallel and no doubt partly owing to this, in practice critical IR scholarship has 
been very much at the margins of the impact agenda. The IR impact case studies 
produced by the top fifteen Politics and International Studies departments for REF 
2014 make this abundantly clear. Not a single one of these 43 case studies is 
explicitly or even evidently underpinned by Marxist, post-structuralist, radical 
feminist or post-colonial scholarship. Not a single one mentions colonialism or 
imperialism. Not a single one of the political economy impact case studies refers to 
neo-liberalism. Only one case study addresses gender inequalities – and with an 
approach that is liberal rather than radical feminist, being focused on the 
representation of women in peace and security decision-making arenas (REF 2014a). 
Only one case study addresses racial discrimination (REF 2014b). And despite the 
fact that so many of the case studies centre on issues of peace, conflict and security, 
case studies that are clearly informed by critical security studies are entirely absent. 
Yet such concerns are not marginal within IR research: many of the above areas are 
among the most vibrant in the whole field. Unfortunately, one gets little sense of this 
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from the 2014 impact case studies. Indeed, on the evidence of these case studies alone, 
one could be forgiven for thinking that the sweeping changes that IR has gone 
through since the late 1980s – the decline of intellectual state-centrism, and the 
flourishing of assorted post-positivist, reflectivist and/or social approaches to 
researching the international – had barely occurred. 
 
If this is so of the intellectual substance of the 2014 IR impact case studies, something 
similar also applies to their declared aims, targets and audiences, and to their narrative 
styles. Very few case studies represent their impact work as opposing, challenging or 
even aspiring to reform policy orthodoxies or established political structures or 
practices; instead most represent their impacts as simply additive, that is, as making 
additions to knowledge and through that adding to policy or practice. Consider the 
verbs used in the titles of the 2014 IR impact case studies. The most widely used is 
‘shaping’ (occurring six times in the 43 case study sample), followed by ‘improving’ 
(five times), ‘influencing’ (five), ‘strengthening’ (four) and ‘informing’ (three). By 
contrast, only three of the 43 case studies headline their impact in reformist terms, 
referring to the ‘redesigning’, ‘reshaping’ and ‘reforming’ of understandings and 
agendas (REF 2014c, REF 2014d, REF 2014e); and only two use an explicitly 
oppositional verb to summarise their impact, one speaking of ‘countering’ and one of 
‘challenging’ existing structures and tendencies (REF 2014f, REF 2014g). No case 
study titles speak of ‘confronting’, ‘condemning’, ‘resisting’, ‘problematising’ or 
‘transforming’ existing understandings and agendas – and none even refer to 
‘inspiring’ change.  
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Moreover, the predominantly uncritical titles of the case studies is matched by the 
balance of their content. Only a quarter of the case studies make any mention at all of 
contesting or undermining existing understandings or policies; in all other cases, both 
research and impacts are exclusively represented in additive terms. Only one case 
study out of the 43 explicitly critiques an aspect of UK foreign policy (REF 2014h), 
while none clearly meet Eric Herring’s criterion for ‘activist IR scholarship’, namely 
that the research should document the record of the state in creating human misery 
abroad (Herring 2006). In only four out of the 43 are Southern states or societies the 
case study’s primary non-academic audience or interlocutor (REF 2014a, REF 2014c, 
REF 2014g, REF 2014i), even though a high proportion of the case studies relate to 
Western state and international organisation knowledge of, and interventions in, these 
states and societies. The large majority of the case studies revolve around impacts for 
government and international organisations; in only two case studies are non-
governmental or activist organisations the primarily beneficiaries (REF 2014j, REF 
2014k), and in only one case, on community participation in Bradford, is the principal 
engagement with non-expert publics (REF 2014l). Only one case study documents 
resistance experienced in the course of impact and engagement work (REF 2014g). 
And last, very few of the case studies detail impact and engagement collaborations in 
any depth, especially noteworthy in this regard being the dearth of discussion of 
Southern partners, even in case studies relating to the global South. There is, in sum, 
only the most limited evidence of a critical social scientific ethos – a recognition of 
the inevitably political character of research, an insistence on the value of social and 
not just policy change, or an ambition to empower actors from the global South – 
within these impact case studies. To the contrary, as in sociology (Back 2015) the vast 
majority of IR case studies are essentially technical or mildly reformist narratives of 
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organic intellectuals helping Western governments and associated intergovernmental 
organisations to refine their techniques of liberal governance.  
 
Lest this may sound too dismissive a verdict, several qualifications are in order. For 
one, the above is not intended as dismissal of ‘mainstream’ case studies (i.e. of those 
case studies not cited above), many of which provide rich and far from irrelevant 
evidence of positive contributions to policy processes; my concern instead is with the 
state of the field’s putatively critical approaches, and its critical ethos and imagination. 
Second, at least some of the patterns identified above can no doubt be explained on 
pragmatic, functional grounds: REF case studies are ultimately bureaucratic 
documents, which are written not for scholarly but for institutional (funding and 
reputational) purposes, and which in 2014 were often written, or at least edited, by 
especially appointed impact consultants or officers – such that it is hardly surprising 
that most of them are so apolitically framed. More broadly, the 43 case studies 
considered above are probably not a particularly representative sample of the diversity 
of impact and engagement work which was done by IR scholars during the preceding 
REF period, given how conservative institutions were in their selection of case studies, 
as the Stern Review among has others observed (Stern et al 2016: 23).  
 
Indeed, many critical IR scholars are deeply committed to doing extensive extra-
academic engagement and impact work – as is clear from my own institution alone. 
Anna Stavrianakis has provided evidence to the House of Commons select committee 
inquiry on the use of UK-supplied weapons in Yemen – contributing, among other 
things, to the UK government being compelled to reveal new information about its 
complicity in potential Saudi war crimes (Stavrianakis, 2016; CAEC 2016; HMG 
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2016). Lara Coleman has worked with peasant, trade union and human rights groups 
in Colombia to help develop human rights protection strategies and support legal 
cases against transnational corporations for violations of human rights (Coleman 
2015; Carson et al 2015). Cynthia Weber has deployed insights from her work on 
queer IR theory to prompt senior UN officials to reflect on their working assumptions 
about gender, sexuality and their links to ideas of race, civilisation and progress 
(Weber 2016a, 2016b). Fabio Petito and colleagues have been drawing together 
coalitions of academics, activists and government officials in pressing for a 
multilateral agenda on freedom of religion and belief (Petito and Ferrari 2013; Petito 
et al 2016). And Peter Newell has, among many other things, worked with local and 
national activist movements to reflect on the possibility of, and strategies for 
achieving, a ‘rapid transition’ to a low-carbon economy (Simms and Newell 2017). 
Such examples – and others from across UK Politics and IR departments – show that 
critical IR scholars are already doing a fantastic diversity of engagement work well 
‘beyond the ivory tower’. 
 
For all this, the facts remain that the REF 2014 case studies provide the only 
collective, public record of the impact and engagement work of Politics and 
International Studies scholars, and that critical IR’s contribution to this public dataset 
is extremely limited. Some of this is no doubt the fault of bureaucratic and 
specifically REF processes – a question to which I return later. But it also clearly 
points to the poverty and in my view inadequacy of critical IR’s extra-academic 
engagements, providing further support for Milja Kurki’s conclusion that critical 
theory-informed research within IR has a worryingly poor record of facilitating 
progressive social change (Kurki 2011). So what might be done? 
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For a socially and politically engaged critical IR 
 
The answer, in my view, is clear: that critical IR needs to rethink and retool itself as a 
socially and politically engaged as much as scholarly practice, to view achieving 
extra-academic impact as a core objective, and to embrace the impact agenda much 
more fully than it has done so far. My reasons for arguing thus are first and foremost 
political, rooted in the requirement for us to consider ‘whose side we are on’. In 
common with other social sciences, IR has always been an interested rather a 
disinterested practice, deeply entangled with political projects and worldly 
developments, above all questions of empire (Dyvik et al 2017). The current 
conjuncture, with its frightening concatenation of chronic problems and crises – the 
manifest failure of Western post-financial crisis economic orthodoxies; the staggering 
recent rises in global temperatures and extreme weather events; the generalised crisis 
in, and spill-over from, the Middle East; the assorted political flights into misogyny, 
authoritarianism, post-truth populism, racism and neo-imperial fantasy; and the 
associated weakening of supra-national norms and institutions – requires us to ask this 
‘whose side?’ question anew. Moreover, the socio-economically privileged position 
of UK-based academics, or at least of those who have got beyond short-term contracts, 
is such that there is a clear responsibility to engage. This responsibility is on the one 
hand to our students, whose fees account for around half of the UK higher education 
sector’s total income and in turn wages. But it is also to society at large, especially 
given that, alone among UK public institutions, universities have till now been 
protected from the misery of austerity by the miracle of student debt. The evident 
beginnings of US-style ‘culture wars’ surrounding UK higher education – in which 
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universities and academics are repeatedly condemned for their left-wing proclivities 
and suppression of right-wing views (see e.g. the appalling Spiked 2017; the not much 
better Carl 2017; and almost every second edition of the Daily Telegraph) – are a 
further cause for reflection. Within these contexts, it cannot be appropriate for 
avowedly ‘critical’ scholarship – that is, scholarship which views knowledge 
production as an inevitably value-laden and interested activity – not to engage. I am 
not by any means suggesting that theoretical, conceptual and historical work are 
without value, or that all critical scholars should be entreated into doing impact work. 
But a critical IR which does not view social and political engagement as a central part 
of its mission is not worthy of the name.  
 
Political reasons aside, there are also good intellectual reasons why critical IR should 
embrace the impact agenda. It is often assumed that what Cox (1981) rather 
unfortunately called ‘problem-solving’ is much better suited than ‘critical’ theory or 
research to achieving non-academic impact. This is no doubt in some contexts correct. 
In some domains, the production of models, projections or scenarios of social 
behaviour and change – that is, work which achieves its intellectual objectives 
simplifying and limiting all sorts of parameters, in precisely the manner described by 
Cox – can be of immense utility. However, within IR positivist research strategies 
have rather less public and policy value. It has repeatedly been observed, for example, 
that ‘the rise of simplistic hypothesis testing’ within US IR has ‘increased the gulf 
between academia and the policy world’ (Mearsheimer and Walt 2013: 448), and that 
very little of what mainstream US IR scholars do is politically useful or relevant 
(Desch 2015). Moreover, it is noteworthy that, of the REF 2014 case studies reviewed 
for this essay, very few involved any quantitative or modelling analysis.  
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There are no doubt many reasons for this evident contrast with other disciplines. But 
one key issue is surely the fact that, unlike in other disciplines, Politics and IR’s 
subject matter revolves around themes – political and governance processes, power, 
state strategy and security – which policy audiences are, or consider themselves to be, 
experts on anyway. Given this crucial context, what is typically most valued by 
policymakers (and other audiences) from Politics and IR research is not abstracted 
models of policy processes or state interactions, however sophisticated these may be, 
but rather contextualised empirical intelligence on particular issues, plus comparative 
and theoretically-informed work which can help cast fresh light on existing challenges. 
Put differently, the most useful knowledge produced by Politics and IR scholars does 
not usually involve discipline-specific techniques or the generation of technical 
‘problem-solving’ truths, but rather qualitative, contextualised and cross-disciplinary 
insights, i.e. precisely those forms of knowledge not associated with positivism (see 
e.g. Desch 2015). If this is right then, paradoxically, critical IR is far better equipped 
for producing politically-relevant knowledge that makes a difference, and for 
embracing the impact agenda, than its supposedly ‘problem-solving’ antithesis. 
 
Of course, various objections could be and have been raised by critical scholars 
against the impact agenda – but most of these are in my view misplaced. Thus the oft-
voiced complaint that impact is a neoliberal tool of governance (e.g. Vincent 2015; 
and more broadly Collini 2012) is simultaneously banal and irrelevant. It is of course 
true that the UK impact agenda arose from a government concern with ensuring 
‘value for money’ and increasing national competitiveness within the context of post-
financial crisis austerity policies. But governance regimes and organisations are 
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always internally contradictory, such that new policies are regularly subverted by 
those who have to implement them (Brunsson 2002); and in any case, all of the UK’s 
national research assessments have been exercises in neoliberal governance, but this 
has not stopped – and maybe has even facilitated – the flourishing of critical 
scholarship within post-Cold War British IR. Something similar applies to the 
question of structure and agency. For while it is true that critical theorists typically 
understand world politics in quite structuralist terms, whereas the impact agenda 
requires and assesses academic agency, it is nevertheless also the case that structure 
and agency are not opposites – indeed structures are often revealed through agency 
(Knafo 2010), making engagement work a powerful addition to the critical IR 
research toolkit. Last, while critical scholars often stress the difficulty, and sometimes 
impossibility, of communicating across the academia-policy divide, and complain 
about the requirement to condense and dumb down findings, my response would be 
‘get over yourselves!’: communication is central to what academics do; we already 
speak and write in multiple sites and genres (from the seminar room to journal 
abstract), constantly shifting how we do so in the process; and the dialogical 
challenges posed by the impact agenda are in essence no different. In each of these 
respects, many of the obstacles to critical impact work are more apparent than real.  
 
Yet there is at least one respect in which this is not the case, and in which the impact 
agenda does pose particular challenges for the critical social sciences and, perhaps 
above all, critical IR: namely, that trying to contest entrenched social or policy 
orthodoxies, or having particularly heterodox interpretations, inevitably complicates 
the processes of obtaining access, of building trust and relationships, and of achieving 
impact. I have encountered this myself on numerous occasions. I have been attacked 
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in the most undiplomatic and personal terms in high political forums on climate 
security, after having the temerity to question received wisdoms on the conflict and 
security implications of climate change (see Selby and Hoffmann 2014). I have lost 
many of my working relationships with Palestinian water experts and institutions 
since going public with the fact that, for over a decade from 1998, the Palestinian 
Authority was routinely approving new Israeli settlement water infrastructures (Selby 
2013). And just last year, myself and colleagues withdrew from a major piece of 
international organisation-commissioned research, after central elements of our 
analysis and most of our conclusions and recommendations were deleted without 
consultation by the organisation’s staff – evidently because our analysis was too 
political. One does not need to be a critical social scientist to have experiences like 
this, of course. But a desire to reveal secrets, lies and flawed or prejudiced thinking, 
or to shed new light on crimes and injustices, makes conflict an ever-present feature 
of critical impact work.  
 
How, then, should critical IR scholars approach impact? How should they navigate 
the many antinomies that it throws up – squaring a commitment to achieving impact 
with a recognition of the powerful obstacles to doing so; maintaining an ethos of 
critical detachment while simultaneously collaborating across the academic-non-
academic divide; participating in a competitive and bureaucratically-defined ‘impact 
agenda’ despite their qualms about it; and so on? What, in short, should a socially- 
and politically-engaged critical IR involve?  
 
I would suggest five broad sets of principles. A first, on the substance of research, is 
simply that critical IR should be guided by a commitment to contributing to 
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progressive social and political change, however conceived. Lest this sounds like a 
truism, let me add some flesh to this principle. It implies, in my view, that our 
research should be organised around and in response to substantive socio-political 
problems and issues, rather than first and foremost around intellectual let alone 
discipline-specific debates (and as a corollary, it implies a radically interdisciplinary 
or even anti-disciplinary understanding of what ‘research in IR’ involves). It means 
that we should get used to asking ourselves, our colleagues and our research students 
how we imagine our research might contribute to progressive social and political 
change, and that we should work to embed this aspiration into our institutional 
research cultures and day-by-day research practises, rather than approaching impact 
work as something discrete which is undertaken by a willing few, after their research 
on a subject has reached fruition. The idea of ‘achieving impact’ undoubtedly has 
bureaucratic as well as individualist, aggressive and masculinist connotations (Phipps 
2017), which many find offensive and alienating. But we should not get fixated on 
this – especially as ‘achieving impact’ is in essence just a shorthand for contributing 
to change beyond academia. 
 
A second suggested principle, on the nature of impact, is that contributing to change 
is an inherently frictional and conflict-laden activity, and should be approached as 
such by critical social scientists. In this respect, indeed, the word ‘impact’ is apposite, 
given that in Newtonian terms there is no impact without resistance. Change always 
involves conflict. Economic development has always involved the destruction of 
hitherto existing practices and structures, or at least their hybridisation in contact with 
the new; only in the neoliberal (or post-genocidal) imagination does development 
unfold on a blank slate and thus not involve the dismantling of traditional forms 
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(Cramer 2006). Likewise, the best research does not merely add new knowledge but 
also replaces established truths and paradigms; knowledge generation, as Roy 
Bhashkar emphasised, is an inherently critical exercise which progresses through 
critique (Collier 1994). And likewise with impact, which is rarely simply additive. For 
the most part, impactful social scientific research is such by virtue of identifying 
flaws within, or at least limitations to, existing socio-political knowledge and/or 
practice. Moreover, such research usually generates divergent responses; it is never 
simply uniformly accepted. In my own experience of producing politically relevant 
research, what typically occurs is that some ‘users’ welcome and applaud it, others 
reject and denounce it, still others seek to co-opt and utilise it for their own purposes – 
and for the most part one only has the faintest idea how ones research is being 
received. Doing critical impact work, in short, involves entering into opaque but 
always conflict-ridden social and political terrains, and thus inevitably involves the 
making not just of friends but also enemies. For the critical social scientist intent on 
doing impact work, there is no getting around this. Indeed I would go so far as to say 
that if your work is not, either directly or indirectly, generating negative reactions, it 
probably means that it is not having significant impact. 
 
A third principle, on the nature of engagement, is that critical impact work is no 
different from other forms in requiring the cultivation of allies and constituencies. My 
central point here is that ‘speaking truth to power’ is not a practical strategy for 
affecting change, however gratifying a slogan it may be. Power will simply ignore 
criticism unless compelled to listen, and wielding truth counts for little if one has few 
allies. Moreover, in practice, those such as Said or Chomsky who advocate ‘speaking 
truth to power’ (see esp. Said 1994) in fact do nothing of the sort: their strategy is 
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instead to speak about power, and to do so to willing or semi-willing liberal and left-
wing public audiences. Stated more theoretically, ‘power’ is not a uniform block, but 
a contested, differentiated and evolving terrain, comprised of multiple conflicting, as 
well as intersecting, hierarchies and strategies; while for its part ‘resistance’ is not a 
limited scholarly-led activity but one that is practised throughout politics and society. 
It thus follows that there are always potential allies or constituencies for critical 
impact work – whether these be new generations or idiosyncratic individuals within 
government departments; social movements and organisations committed to 
challenging established ways; or publics, whose lives have been deeply scarred by 
politics and power. In official impact discourse, such actors are usually referred to as 
the potential ‘users’ or ‘beneficiaries’ of research. But such framings are 
problematically apolitical, obscuring the inherently political and conflictual character 
of impact work. It is both more accurate and more strategically helpful, in my view, to 
think of these users as public or policy ‘allies’ or ‘constituencies’ for research. And it 
should also be emphasised, just in case it does not go without saying, that there is no 
reason whatsoever that impact needs to be conceived as ‘impact on policy’, as both 
REF regulations and various analyses (e.g. Bastow et al 2014) have recognised. 
 
A fourth principle, on specific engagement strategies, is that engagement strategies 
need to be flexible, dynamic and context-sensitive; or, put differently, that it is not 
possible to set out a priori how engagement should be done. Difficult judgements 
often have to be made – about the relative merits of ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’ 
strategies (Newell and Stavrianakis 2017); about the likely practical and reputational 
consequences of specific collaborations; about forms of collaboration (from those 
which involve a sharp distinction between ‘research’ and its ‘constituencies’, through 
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to those which blur this divide through academic-non-academic co-development); 
about what compromises to accept; and about when the intellectual or political 
consequences of engagements require one to walk away. Beyond this, I would make 
several general recommendations on engagement strategies and their translation into 
impact:  
 
• Given that impact, when it occurs, is always to some degree accidental 
(resulting, for example, from a temporary coincidence of new research and a 
political process for which intellectual ballast is required), and always unfolds 
in ways which are beyond ones control (as an extreme example, some of my 
recent research may end up feeding climate-sceptic arguments, which is far 
from what I want or intend: Selby et al 2017a; and for discussion of this issue 
Selby et al 2017b), it follows that impact is ultimately less an accomplishment 
than an occurrence, and may sometimes be little more than a happenstance, 
and that both insouciance and humility about ‘achieving it’ are therefore in 
order.  
 
• Given that pathways to impact are so often potholed with failures, and often 
come to dead ends, it makes sense to approach engagement not just as a means 
to impactful ends but also as an end in itself, plus as a way of embedding 
oneself within networks relating to ones research; engagement, in this sense, 
should in my view be thought of as immanent to the research process, and not 
as a step in some linear chain between research and impact. 
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• Given how often research is ignored and advances are rejected, especially if 
one is doing critical work, it follows that regular reflection on appropriate 
engagement strategies is crucial (as illustration, I have recently changed my 
approach to generating impact on climate security discourse: a complete 
failure of meaningful ‘insider’ conversations with government and NGO 
officials on this issue led me to instead prioritise research which will hopefully 
attract media attention and in turn perhaps prompt policymakers and NGOs to 
revisit their thinking: Selby et al 2017a is one early result of this revised 
research and engagement strategy). 
 
• As a qualifier to this example, those doing impact work have a responsibility 
not to engage in the more questionable forms of ‘impact chasing’ – whether 
these involve exaggerating or over-simplifying research findings in order to 
attract media or policy attention, or competing with fellow academics for 
‘ownership’ of impacts. 
 
• Last, in light of the fact that critical impact and engagement work is inevitably 
political and conflict-laden, and given that this conflict can get quite dark – 
especially when in the form of social media abuse (see e.g. Phipps 2014) – 
those doing such work need to be aware of its potential emotional toll, while 
the academic communities and institutions around them need to be cognisant 
of their duties of care in this regard.  
 
Returning to our list of principles, a fifth, on potential impact case studies, is that 
critical scholars should approach these as a stimulus to social and political 
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engagement while doing their utmost not to betray critical political sensibilities. This 
means, in my view, that case study documents should emphasise the role of 
partnerships and collaborations, especially those with other academics and 
marginalised groups, and should not just depict impact as a heroic, individual 
achievement; that they should forefront discussion of the political contexts of impact 
and engagement work, including by acknowledging resistance and failures; and that 
they should be explicit about theoretical underpinnings – since theory usually is an 
important underpinning, and since it will do the social sciences no good at all if 
theoretical reflection is thought to be irrelevant to its broader social purposes. Given 
that REF case studies are the only public record we have of our impact and 
engagement activity, it is important that we do not simplify and depoliticise them 
more than we have to. And, among other things, this means in my view that research 
support officers and consultants should not be writing impact case studies. Our 
institutions permitting, it is us academics who should have responsibility for case 
studies, and for recording our impact and engagement work with all the complexity 
and richness that it deserves.  
 
 
Lessons for the impact agenda 
 
Critical IR, I have argued, should embrace impact. But implicit within these 
arguments is also that funding councils, research councils, scholarly bodies and 
research assessments should consider modifying their approach to the impact agenda, 
including by embracing a more critical and political understanding of what impact is 
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and how it is achieved. By way of conclusion, I want to suggest four respects in 
which this is so, and out of this to offer four recommendations for reform.  
 
First, the ‘hero scholar’ narrative style which predominates across the REF 2014 case 
studies is not just politically questionable; it is also essentially unrealistic (as well as 
contrary to the REF goal of assessing the impact of institutions, not individuals). 
Individualistic hero narratives inevitably focus on successes alone, leading to the 
stripping away of discussion of accident, resistance and context. Moreover, such 
narratives inevitably say little about engagement processes, whether these be the 
countless unacknowledged external conversations and collaborations which underpin 
impact, or the unrecognised labour of (mainly female) internal research support 
officers. Some of this is no doubt inevitable within the context of short documents 
submitted for research assessment. However, this hero scholar tendency could be 
reined in if greater emphasis were placed on processes of engagement, and slightly 
less on the impacts achieved. In my view, the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE) should make this a requirement for future impact case studies, and 
should seek to assess both impact and engagement.  
 
Paralleling this, secondly, is the problematically apolitical style of the 2014 case 
studies – a style which assumes, or at least represents, the relations between 
academics and their users as inherently benign, learning-oriented and non-conflictual. 
And yet as indicated above, such representations are essentially unrealistic, since 
conflict, struggle and difference are inherent to, and maybe even the defining features 
of, social and political life; and since contributing to change always involves friction 
and resistance, if not destruction. Put differently, not only was there an unfortunately 
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widespread hero scholar tendency within the 2014 impact case studies; even worse, 
most of these case studies’ scholarly heroes didn’t slay any dragons. What we find in 
these case studies, instead, is a model of ‘frictionless heroism’, in which enemies are 
neither heard nor seen. What sort of heroism is this? How dull would fairy tales or 
great tragedies be if their main characters didn’t have to slay any external or internal 
demons?  
 
In my view, the rules and expectations for future research assessments should be 
adjusted in recognition of this problem. Institutions and case study authors might be 
encouraged to document and reflect on opposition and resistance, and even to include 
accounts of ‘failure’ – at least in cases where the engagement work in question is 
ambitious and potentially hugely transformative, but where impact is frustrated and 
limited by external factors and forces. As above, this suggests that case studies should 
not only be assessed on grounds of impact achieved; processes and experiences of 
engagement should be evaluated too (see also Upton et al 2014). An additional benefit 
here would be the production of more interesting case studies – accounts of politically 
engaged academia in practice rather than documents which read like they’ve been 
written by the same people responsible for university mission statements. 
 
Third, as the analysis above hopefully makes clear, there is no level playing field 
when doing impact work. Put simply, proximity to power and alignment with its 
various interests can much more easily generate what looks like a powerful impact 
case study than work which seeks to contest it; and research which involves refining 
liberal techniques of governance is much more likely to result in warm ‘impact 
testimonies’ from the great and the good, or in invitations to sit on government-
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commissioned panels, than research which identifies state corruption, collusion, 
hypocrisy or error. In practice, the critical IR scholar’s experience of engagement 
typically involves the odd, perhaps fleeting opportunity for impact, alongside a much 
more consistent pattern of being dismissed, sidelined and ignored. Even those critical 
scholars who employ ‘insider strategies’, constructively engaging with policymakers 
and practitioners despite their differences with them, often find that this engagement 
only goes so far, and that at some point or another, conflict will break out and 
relationships cultivated over many years will break down. The REF 2014 impact 
assessment criteria of ‘reach’ and ‘significance’ did not allow for this, and as such 
were ‘not on the side of’, indeed were effectively biased against, critical scholarship. 
To fully encourage and open itself up to such scholarship, future REFs should in my 
view not only assess reach and significance; they should do this relative to the 
contexts – the uneven playing fields – within which impact is achieved.  
 
Now, it may be that the REF 2014 Politics and International Studies sub-panel was 
sensitive to these issues, and that their judgements did take account of case studies’ 
varying contexts and relations with power, despite there being nothing to this effect in 
the REF regulations. But even if this was the case – and I have no knowledge on this 
either way – there remains a problem. For unless there is explicit acknowledgement 
from HEFCE of the unevenness of the impact playing field, as well as licence for 
REF panels to take this unevenness into consideration when making their assessments, 
then universities and their research managers will in all likelihood continue to play 
safe by avoiding submitting the sort of contextualised, political, ambiguous and 
frankly realistic accounts of impact which are the typical corollary of engaged critical 
social scientific research.  
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None of this would be such a major problem if there existed sufficient spaces for 
academic dialogue on impact and engagement – but, by way of a final point, there do 
not. Consider the contrast with the ‘research output’ element of the REF. In this case, 
the source material – the hundreds of thousands of publications produced during each 
assessment cycle – is all published and available, access allowing; and is a living, 
developing body of work which is constantly being discussed, debated, critiqued and 
extended, with only a small proportion of it being subject to the closed, 
bureaucratically-defined process of research assessment. By contrast, on impact, the 
case studies are the only collective, public record which we’ve got. There is the 
occasional blog, of course, and the odd special issue. But if one wants to understand 
how critical IR, or indeed any other branch of research in the UK, is engaging beyond 
the ivory tower, it is basically to the joyless pages of the REF which one must turn. Is 
it any wonder, given this, that many academics feel so alienated by the impact 
agenda?  
 
Addressing this problem could involve any number of things, from the embedding of 
dialogue and learning about impact experiences within the annual conferences and 
working groups of scholarly associations, through to the launch of dedicated peer 
reviewed journals on the subject – starting with, say, a Journal of Political 
Engagement. No doubt such steps would have their pitfalls. Increased scholarly 
dialogue on impact and engagement, equivalent to that which we find on the 
substance of our research, and on methodology and pedagogy, would clearly extend 
the reach of the impact agenda and further embed and normalise it within academic 
practice. And some would doubtless oppose this. But, in my view, if we want to 
 26 
embed a commitment to contributing to progressive social change within academic 
practice, then that is precisely what we need.  
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